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WHAT GENETIC TESTING TEACHES ABOUT 
PREDICTIVE HEALTH ANALYTICS REGULATION* 
SHARONA HOFFMAN** 
The ever-growing phenomenon of predictive health analytics is generating 
significant excitement, hope for improved health outcomes, and potential for new 
revenues. Researchers are developing algorithms to predict suicide, heart disease, 
stroke, diabetes, cognitive decline, opioid abuse, cancer recurrence, and other 
ailments. The researchers include not only medical experts, but also commercial 
enterprises, such as Facebook and LexisNexis, who may profit from the work 
considerably. This Article focuses on long-term disease predictions (i.e., 
predictions regarding future illnesses), which have received surprisingly little 
attention in the legal and ethical literature. It compares the robust academic and 
policy debates and legal interventions that followed the emergence of genetic 
testing to the relatively anemic reaction to predictions produced by artificial 
intelligence and other predictive methods. This Article argues that, like genetic 
testing, predictive health analytics raises significant concerns about psychological 
harm, privacy breaches, discrimination, and the meaning and accuracy of 
predictions. Consequently, as alluring as the new predictive technologies are, 
they require careful consideration and thoughtful safeguards. These include 
changes to the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, careful oversight mechanisms, and self-regulation by healthcare 
providers. Ignoring the hazards of long-term predictive health analytics and 
failing to provide data subjects with appropriate rights and protections would be 
a grave mistake. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The ever-growing phenomenon of predictive health analytics1 is 
generating significant excitement, hope for improved health outcomes, and 
potential for new revenues.2 Researchers are developing algorithms to predict 
suicide, heart disease, stroke, diabetes, cognitive decline, opioid abuse, cancer 
 
 1. See infra notes 19–24 and accompanying text for a definition and discussion of predictive 
health analytics. 
 2. See Jennifer Bresnick, 10 High-Value Use Cases for Predictive Analytics in Healthcare, HEALTH 
IT ANALYTICS (Sept. 4, 2018), https://healthitanalytics.com/news/10-high-value-use-cases-for-
predictive-analytics-in-healthcare [https://perma.cc/S4SQ-HDGM]. 
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recurrence, and other ailments.3 In 2017, the Society of Actuaries found that 
ninety-three percent of healthcare and health insurance executives surveyed 
believed that predictive analytics is important to their future success.4 Indeed, 
some experts forecast that predictive health analytics will be a commonplace 
medical tool in the near future.5 
Healthcare providers can also use predictive health analytics for treatment 
purposes in the short term.6 For example, predictive health analytics can help 
physicians identify patients who are at risk of hospital readmission because of 
complications.7 This Article, however, focuses on health analytics that predicts 
health problems in the more distant future, which this Article calls “long-term 
predictive health analytics.” For instance, scientists are developing techniques 
to forecast conditions such as heart disease or cognitive decline that could be 
years or decades away.8 
In some instances, such forecasts can be medically beneficial because they 
are clinically actionable—clinicians can commence early screening of known 
affected individuals and implement preventive interventions.9 In the case of 
heart disease, for example, these actions might include drugs, exercise, and 
improved diet.10 
At the same time, predictive health analytics can be potentially harmful.11 
Individuals who are identified as having a high risk of developing future health 
problems, such as cognitive decline or opioid addiction, may suffer 
psychological distress, privacy violations (if the information is circulated to 
unauthorized third parties), discrimination, and other harms.12 One scholar has 
worried that people labelled as being at high risk of suicide will be treated 
 
 3. See infra Section I.B. 
 4. SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS IN HEALTHCARE TREND FORECAST 2, 4 
(2017), https://www.soa.org/Files/programs/predictive-analytics/2017-health-care-trend.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/A73Q-ZVA6]. The survey included 223 participants. Id. at 2. 
 5. See Eric J. Topol, High-Performance Medicine: The Convergence of Human and Artificial 
Intelligence, 25 NATURE MED. 44, 44 (2019). 
 6. I. Glenn Cohen et al., The Legal and Ethical Concerns That Arise from Using Complex Predictive 
Analytics in Health Care, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1139, 1140 (2014) (explaining that “it has become possible 
to apply predictive analytics to health care”). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See infra Section I.B. 
 9. Bresnick, supra note 2. 
 10. Strategies to Prevent Heart Disease, MAYO CLINIC (Jan. 9, 2019), 
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/heart-disease/in-depth/heart-disease-prevention/art-
20046502 [https://perma.cc/FKV2-FL7E]. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
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differently by their physicians.13 Specifically, physicians might discontinue 
beneficial medications for fear that they will exacerbate the suicide risk, 
unnecessarily send police to patients’ homes, forcibly hospitalize patients, or 
relate to them in a demeaning, dehumanizing way.14 
Moreover, predictive health analytics outcomes can be erroneous for a 
variety of reasons.15 Thus, individuals may endure serious adverse consequences 
based on mistaken predictions when, in truth, there is no evidence they are at 
risk of developing the alleged health problems. 
This Article argues that we are doing alarmingly little to identify and 
address the ethical and legal implications of long-term predictive health 
analytics. This is in stark contrast to policymakers’ thoughtful approach to the 
emergence of genetic testing several decades ago.16 This Article highlights the 
discrepancy between society’s relatively cautious approach to genetic testing 
and its more cavalier approach to predictive analytics and argues that, as they 
did in the case of genetic testing, scientists must carefully consider the benefits 
and risks of predictive health analytics and implement safeguards to address its 
potential hazards. 
Accordingly, this Article suggests that data subjects should enjoy rights 
that give them some degree of control over their data including predicted health 
outcomes. They should have expanded rights to consent to disclosure of their 
health information, to discover who has seen their health data, and to sue for 
both privacy breaches that harm them and for discrimination based on disease 
predictions.17 Additionally, the scientific community should develop oversight 
mechanisms to safeguard the quality of predictive models.18 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes long-
term predictive health analytics and illustrates the work that scientists are 
conducting in this area; Part II analyzes the precedent of genetic testing, 
focusing on the concerns that it raised and the measures that policymakers 
implemented to address those concerns; Part III examines the risks of long-
term predictive health analytics; Part IV develops preliminary 
recommendations for responsive legal and policy changes; and finally, Part V 
concludes. 
 
 13. See Mason Marks, Artificial Intelligence Based Suicide Prediction, YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & 
ETHICS (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 22) (on file with North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter 
Marks, Artificial Intelligence] (“People placed in this category [of suicide-prone individuals] may be 
treated differently by physicians in ways that endanger their health and safety.”). 
 14. Id. (manuscript at 22–24). 
 15. See infra Section III.C. 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. See infra Section IV.A. 
 18. See infra Section IV.B. 
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I. LONG-TERM PREDICTIVE HEALTH ANALYTICS 
A. Predictive Health Analytics Defined 
Predictive analytics is defined as “the analysis of large data sets to discover 
patterns and [the] use [of] those patterns to forecast or predict the likelihood of 
future events.”19 Experts conduct this analysis using computer algorithms.20 An 
algorithm is a precise step-by-step process that leaves nothing to guesswork or 
intuition.21 Learning algorithms train predictive models using training sets 
comprised of sample input and output values.22 Some analysts use the term 
“predictive modeling,” which can be defined as “the process of developing a 
mathematical tool or model that generates an accurate prediction.”23 
Researchers often use the terms “learning algorithm” and “predictive model” 
interchangeably, although the term “predictive model” suggests a 
representation of knowledge that is created by an algorithm.24 Predictive 
analytics is based on techniques from three closely related areas of research: 
statistical inference, data mining, and machine learning.25 
Statistical inference involves analyzing a sample dataset, inferring 
properties of a larger population based on this sample, and characterizing 
uncertainties about those properties.26 Data mining is “the practice of searching 
through large amounts of computerized data to find useful patterns or trends.”27 
 
 19. David Crockett, Ryan Johnson & Brian Eliason, What is Data Mining in Healthcare?, HEALTH 
CATALYST 1, 1 (2017), https://www.healthcatalyst.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/What-is-data-
mining-in-healthcare.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PUQ-F6CY]. 
 20. See Cohen et al., supra note 6, at 1139; W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 
116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 425–26 (2017) (discussing the nature of medical algorithms). 
 21. Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the Law, 31 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 23 (2017). 
 22. See SHAI SHALEV-SHWARTZ & SHAI BEN-DAVID, UNDERSTANDING MACHINE 
LEARNING: FROM THEORY TO ALGORITHMS 13–14 (2014) (discussing “the statistical learning 
framework”). 
 23. MAX KUHN & KJELL JOHNSON, APPLIED PREDICTIVE MODELING 2 (2013). 
 24. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
 25. See generally BRUCE RATNER, STATISTICAL AND MACHINE-LEARNING DATA MINING: 
TECHNIQUES FOR BETTER PREDICTIVE MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF BIG DATA 3–11 (3d ed. 
2017) (ebook) (discussing statistical interference, data mining, and machine learning). 
 26. WILLIAM L. HAYS, STATISTICS 1 (4th ed. 1988) (describing statistical inference as a process 
of analysis that enables one to “make general statements about the large body of potential observations, 
of which the data collected represents but a sample”); Statistical Inference, OXFORD DICTIONARY, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/statistical_inference [https://perma. cc/2VLV-H48N] 
(defining statistical inference as “[t]he theory, methods, and practice of forming judgments about the 
parameters of a population and the reliability of statistical relationships, typically on the basis of 
random sampling”). 
 27. Data Mining, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/data%
20mining [https://perma.cc/9Y3R-J2W6]. 
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In more technical terms, it is the process of using algorithms to examine “big 
data” from sources such as databases or the internet in order to unearth hidden 
knowledge or patterns.28 “Big data” is characterized by its “three Vs”: high 
volume, variety, and velocity, the last referring to the speed with which data are 
generated.29 In healthcare, big data can come from a myriad of sources, 
including patients, healthcare providers, insurers, manufacturers, the 
government, and even mobile devices such as smartphones and wearables.30 For 
example, Geisinger Health System, which operates in Pennsylvania and New 
Jersey, has created a large unified data architecture.31 It draws upon a variety of 
sources including electronic health records, patient satisfaction surveys, and 
wellness apps.32 
Readers are most likely familiar with the general term “artificial 
intelligence,” which refers to computers’ ability to mimic human behavior and 
learn.33 One type of artificial intelligence is machine learning, which refers to 
methods that enable computers to “automatically detect patterns in data, and 
then use the uncovered patterns to predict future data, or to perform other kinds 
of decision-making under uncertainty.”34 Scientists train computers to do 
analytical work by feeding them information, such as patients’ medical 
 
 28. JIAWEI HAN, MICHELINE KAMBER & JIAN PEI, DATA MINING: CONCEPTS AND 
TECHNIQUES 8 (3d ed. 2012) (ebook). 
 29. SHARONA HOFFMAN, ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS AND MEDICAL BIG DATA: LAW 
AND POLICY 111 (2016); W. Nicholson Price II & I. Glenn Cohen, Privacy in the Age of Medical Big 
Data, 25 NATURE MED. 37, 37 (2019). 
 30. Nathan Cortez, Substantiating Big Data in Health Care, 14 I/S 61, 63–64 (2017) (discussing the 
breadth of big data sources). 
 31. See generally Alistair R. Erskine et al., How Geisinger Health System Uses Big Data to Save Lives, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 15, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/12/how-geisinger-health-system-uses-big-
data-to-save-lives [https://perma.cc/W9QN-4T4A] (describing the Geisinger data system, its creation, 
and its uses).  
 32. Id. (explaining that the system integrates data, with patient permission, reports from different 
departmental systems and hospitals, information from participation surveys, and data from wellness 
apps to get a more complete understanding of the patient’s health). 
 33. See IAN GOODFELLOW, YOSHUA BEBGIO & AARON COURVILLE, DEEP LEARNING 1–8 
(2016) (discussing the basic notion of artificial intelligence and the different learning process that can 
be applied to create AI).  
 34. KEVIN P. MURPHY, MACHINE LEARNING: A PROBABILISTIC PERSPECTIVE 1 (2012); see 
also David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine 
Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 671 (2017) (“Fundamentally, machine learning refers to an 
automated process of discovering correlations (sometimes alternatively referred to as relationships or 
patterns) between variables in a dataset, often to make predictions or estimates of some outcome.”); 
Alvin Rajkomar, Jeffrey Dean & Isaac Kohane, Machine Learning in Medicine, 380 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1347, 1348 (2019) (explaining that “in machine learning, a model learns from examples rather than 
being programmed with rules”). 
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records.35 For example, scientists might show computers a large number of 
tumor images with indications as to which ones are cancerous and which ones 
are not.36 The computers then learn to differentiate between benign and 
malignant tumors based on patterns in the tumor x-rays or scans so that they 
can identify cancerous tumors when shown new images.37 
A well-known type of machine learning is deep learning, which allows 
computers “to learn from experience and understand the world in terms of a 
hierarchy of concepts, with each concept defined through its relation to simpler 
concepts.”38 Thus, computers gather knowledge from experience and learn more 
complex concepts by building on simpler concepts.39 
Predictive models are valuable for physicians, researchers, and 
policymakers.40 They can help public health officials identify those who are at 
highest risk of developing a disease so that health officials can implement 
preventive interventions.41 In the clinical setting, predictive models may discern 
which patients are likely to have poor or successful treatment outcomes so 
physicians can tailor their medical decisions accordingly.42 Predictive analytics 
may also help identify high-risk individuals whom doctors should aggressively 
screen for particular diseases.43 
Thus, predictive health analytics can generate projections of health 
problems that may plague individuals in the future.44 Such predictions can be 
beneficial to patients if physicians intervene to prevent or detect the condition 
at a very early stage. However, such predictions can also render the patient 
 
 35. See Niha Beig et al., Perinodular and Intranodular Radiomic Features on Lung CT Images 
Distinguish Adenocarcinomas from Granulomas, 290 RADIOLOGY 783, 784 (2019) (relating that a 
“machine classifier was trained on a cohort of 145 patients”). 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. at 792. 
 38. GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 33, at 1. 
 39. Id. For example, the technique is used for facial recognition. See Divyansh Dwivedi, Face 
Detection for Beginners, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Apr. 27, 2018), https://towardsdatascience.com/face-
detection-for-beginners-e58e8f21aad9 [https://perma.cc/QM8P-TCU3]. A deep learner might first 
recognize simple features such as lines, then slightly more complex features such as regions, and finally 
entire faces. See id.; see generally Wenzhi Zhao & Shihong Du, Spectral–Spatial Feature Extraction for 
Hyperspectral Image Classification: A Dimension Reduction and Deep Learning Approach, 54 IEEE 
TRANSACTIONS ON GEOSCIENCE & REMOTE SENSING 4544, 4544 (2016) (describing deep learning 
approaches to using spectral–spatial feature classifications). 
 40. EWOUT W. STEYERBERG, CLINICAL PREDICTION MODELS 1–2, 11 (2009). 
 41. Id. at 11–12.  
 42. Id. at 11. 
 43. Id. at 11–12.  
 44. See infra Section I.B. 
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vulnerable to adverse psychological consequences, discrimination, and other 
harms.45 
B. Long-Term Predictive Health Analytics Examples 
Scientists are working hard to identify physical and behavioral clues that 
might indicate an individual’s future health status. Many studies focus on the 
question of whether there are traits, habits, or other indicators that signal that 
an individual is vulnerable to particular diseases in the future.46 
Currently, medical researchers are investigating biomarkers that help 
them discern disease risks. A “biomarker” is a “biological molecule found in 
blood, other body fluids, or tissues that is a sign of a normal or abnormal process, 
or of a condition or disease.”47 For example, researchers reported in 2014 that 
people with lower levels of ten identified phospholipids in their blood were at 
higher risk of having existing cognitive impairments or declining cognitively 
within a few years.48 
Other physiological phenomena can also serve as predictors of future 
health risks. A 2018 study focused on retinopathy,49 an eye condition that is 
caused by damage to the small retinal blood vessels in the eye,50 found that 
retinopathy was associated with higher rates of cognitive decline over the next 
twenty years.51 
Human eyes can also reveal information about cardiovascular risks. In 
2018, researchers from Google and its health-tech subsidiary, Verily, used 
carefully validated deep learning models trained on medical data from nearly 
300,000 patients to predict the values of known heart disease risk factors from 
 
 45. See infra Part III. 
 46. See Ran Balicer, The Doctor Will See Your Future Now, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/startupnationcentral/2018/04/16/for-predictive-medicine-its-back-to-
the-future/#5d1714da3525 [https://perma.cc/XH29-FEU7]. 
 47. NCI Dictionary of Cancer Terms, NAT’L CANCER INST., www.cancer.gov/publications/
dictionaries/cancer-terms?cdrid=45618 [https://perma.cc/RQP3-CLLR]. 
 48. Alison Abbott, Biomarkers Could Predict Alzheimer’s Before It Starts, NATURE (Mar. 9, 2014), 
https://www.nature.com/news/biomarkers-could-predict-alzheimer-s-before-it-starts-1.14834 
[https://perma.cc/7FCS-E22L]. 
 49. See Jennifer A. Deal et al., Retinal Signs and 20-Year Cognitive Decline in the Atherosclerosis Risk 
in Communities Study, 90 NEUROLOGY e1158, e1158 (2018). 
 50. Janet M. Torpy, Retinopathy, 298 JAMA 944, 944 (2007); Diabetic Retinopathy, MAYO CLINIC, 
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/diabetic-retinopathy/symptoms-causes/syc-20371611 
[https://perma.cc/3LGV-NRRE]. 
 51. Deal et al., supra note 49, at e1158, e1165. The study involved 12,317 men and women who 
were fifty to seventy-three years of age when they were first examined. Id. 
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retinal fundus images.52 The risk factors included age, gender, smoking status, 
systolic blood pressure, and past major cardiac events.53 The deep learner then 
used images to predict heart disease risks directly.54 In addition, the researchers 
identified the anatomical regions the deep learner might have been using to 
make its predictions, which they believed included the optic nerve and blood 
vessels.55 The authors acknowledged that further research with larger datasets is 
needed to verify their results.56 
IBM researchers “identified an automated machine-learning speech 
classifier” that could predict psychosis based on the speech patterns of high-risk 
patients.57 The technique relied on indicators such as less semantic coherence 
and diminished use of possessive pronouns and reportedly achieved an eighty-
three percent accuracy rate.58 
Learning algorithms have been able to predict Alzheimer’s disease up to 
six years before it manifests.59 Researchers are also working to determine 
whether machine learning can predict premature death associated with chronic 
disease.60 
Oncologists have developed algorithms to predict patients’ prognosis after 
cancer treatment.61 For example, they have developed machine-learning tools 
 
 52. Ryan Poplin et al., Prediction of Cardiovascular Risk Factors from Retinal Fundus Photographs via 
Deep Learning, 2 NATURE BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING 158, 158 (2018); James Vincent, Google’s New 
AI Algorithm Predicts Heart Disease by Looking at Your Eyes, VERGE (Feb. 19, 2018), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/19/17027902/google-verily-ai-algorithm-eye-scan-heart-disease-
cardiovascular-risk [https://perma.cc/P4KB-RX34] (“As with all deep learning analysis, neural 
networks were then used to mine this information for patterns, learning to associate telltale signs in 
the eye scans with the metrics needed to predict cardiovascular risk (e.g., age and blood pressure).”). 
The retinal fundus is the interior lining of the eyeball, including the retina, optic disc, and the macula. 
William C. Shiel Jr., Medical Definition of Retinal Fundus, MEDICINENET (Dec. 27, 2018), 
https://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=10601 [https://perma.cc/3RWG-
BYCW].  
 53. Poplin et al., supra note 52, at 158, 161–62. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. at 161–62.  
 57. Cheryl M. Corcoran et al., Prediction of Psychosis Across Protocols and Risk Cohorts Using 
Automated Language Analysis, 17 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 67, 67 (2018). 
 58. Id. at 67, 70. 
 59. Ana Sandoiu, Using Artificial Intelligence to Predict Mortality, MED. NEWS TODAY (Mar. 29, 
2019), https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/324828.php [https://perma.cc/UN2J-S5W9]. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Masahiro Takada et al., Prediction of Postoperative Disease-Free Survival and Brain Metastasis 
for HER2-Positive Breast Cancer Patients Treated with Neoadjuvant Chemotherapy Plus Trastuzumab Using 
a Machine Learning Algorithm, 172 BREAST CANCER RES. & TREATMENT 611, 611 (2018). 
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to predict the likelihood of recurrence and brain metastasis in certain breast 
cancer and lung cancer patients.62 
Electronic documentation has been particularly helpful for purposes of 
health predictions. In 2014, IBM announced that it had analyzed electronic 
health records from Virginia’s Carilion Clinic and was able to identify 8500 
patients who were at risk of heart failure.63 Scientists have also been able to 
analyze electronic health records and medical claims data to predict which 
individuals will develop depression or diabetes-related problems up to a year in 
advance.64 The U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs recently launched a 
program called “VA REACH VET” that uses a predictive model to analyze 
veterans’ electronic health records and identify individuals at high risk of 
suicide.65  
C. Nontraditional Data Sources for Predictive Health Analytics 
Analysts are turning to nontraditional data sources as well. For example, 
several years ago, Carolinas Healthcare (now Atrium Health) purchased 
consumer information from data brokers66 in an effort to use algorithms to 
identify high-risk patients.67 Information garnered from credit card purchasing 
 
 62. Id. at 611, 616. See generally Jing Zhong et al., Constructing a Risk Prediction Model for Lung 
Cancer Recurrence by Using Gene Function Clustering and Machine Learning, 22 COMBINATORIAL 
CHEMISTRY & HIGH THROUGHPUT SCREENING 226 (2019) (discussing, in the case of lung cancer, 
the use of preventive screening tools to identify risk of metastasis in patients and to intervene earlier). 
 63. Mohana Ravindranath, IBM Used Predictive Analytics to Find Patients at Risk of Heart Failure, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2014), www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-it/ibm-used-predictive-
analytics-to-find-patients-at-risk-of-heart-failure/2014/02/20/9b0ddb3c-9a47-11e3-b88d-
f36c07223d88_story.html [https://perma.cc/JM6G-JJAQ (dark archive)]; Press Release, IBM, IBM 
Predictive Analytics to Detect Patients at Risk for Heart Failure (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www-
03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/43231.wss [https://perma.cc/2CHV-UDTY]. 
 64. Arthur Allen, Big Brother Is Watching Your Waist, POLITICO (July 21, 2014), 
www.politico.com/story/2014/07/data-mining-health-care-109153 [https://perma.cc/7RBA-YH6D]. 
 65. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Veterans Affairs, VA REACH VET Initiative Helps Save Veterans 
Lives: Program Signals When More Help Is Needed for At-Risk Veterans (Apr. 3, 2017), 
https://www.va.gov/opa/pressrel/includes/viewpdf.cfm?id=2878 [https://perma.cc/PV2U-E8FX]. 
 66. Data brokers are “companies that collect information, including personal information about 
consumers, from a wide variety of sources for the purpose of reselling such information to their 
customers for various purposes .	.	.	.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN 
AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 68 (2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/
120326privacyreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8SJ-P2GA]; see also Janine S. Hiller, Healthy Predictions? 
Questions for Data Analytics in Health Care, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 251, 271–72 (2016) (discussing data brokers 
and health data streams). 
 67. Melanie Hicken, Big Data: Look Who’s Buying Your Personal Information, CNN MONEY (Sept. 
10, 2014), https://money.cnn.com/gallery/pf/2014/09/07/big-data-personal-information/3.html 
[https://perma.cc/SNF5-N7HC]; Shannon Pettypiece & Jordan Robertson, Hospitals, Including 
Carolinas HealthCare, Using Consumer Purchase Data for Information on Patient Health, CHARLOTTE 
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records or grocery loyalty cards can indicate whether individuals are buying 
healthy food, smoking, refilling their prescriptions, and buying gym 
memberships.68 These data points in turn can predict the likelihood that 
someone will have a severe asthma or heart attack.69 
The University of Pittsburgh Medical Center has used patient 
demographic and household information to predict health risks.70 It concluded 
that people who do not reside with children and earn less than $50,000 annually 
are more likely to go to an emergency room rather than visit a doctor’s office, 
even though the latter is a much less costly option that is appropriate for many 
conditions.71 Likewise, it concluded that individuals without a car may not be 
receiving adequate medical care.72 Healthcare systems assert that they use such 
information in order to implement preventive and corrective interventions for 
patients.73 However, skeptics have questioned their true motivations, 
suspecting that cost savings are at the heart of the matter and worrying that data 
mining practices compromise patient privacy and damage the physician-patient 
relationship.74 
Social media has become an increasingly common source of data used for 
predictive health analytics as well. Researchers recently reported that they used 
an algorithm to analyze Facebook data from close to 1200 consenting users and 
identified linguistic signals that could predict future depression.75 
Facebook itself has joined the fray of predictive health analytics. Its 
software now monitors users’ posts to identify those with suicidal intent, and 
an algorithm assigns a risk score ranging from zero to one.76 The algorithm 
interprets phrases such as “Are you okay?” paired with “Goodbye” and “Please 
 
OBSERVER (June 27, 2014), https://www.charlotteobserver.com/living/health-family/
article9135980.html [https://perma.cc/V69S-TK4U (staff uploaded archive)]. 
 68. Pettypiece & Robertson, supra note 67. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. For a discussion of concerns raised by predictive analytics, see infra Part III. 
 75. Johannes C. Eichstaedt et al., Facebook Language Predicts Depression in Medical Records, 115 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11203, 11203, 11207 (2018). 
 76. Benjamin Goggin, Inside Facebook’s Suicide Algorithm: Here’s How the Company Uses Artificial 
Intelligence to Predict Your Mental State from Your Posts, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 6, 2019), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-is-using-ai-to-try-to-predict-if-youre-suicidal-2018-12 
[https://perma.cc/5KBE-MG8T]; Martin Kaste, Facebook Increasingly Reliant on A.I. To Predict Suicide 
Risk, NPR (Nov. 17, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/17/668408122/facebook-increasingly-reliant-
on-a-i-to-predict-suicide-risk [https://perma.cc/R932-9JPL]. 
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don’t do this” as clues that someone is in distress.77 In cases it assesses as severe, 
Facebook contacts the police, as it did at least 3500 times in 2018.78 
Unfortunately, police officers who are poorly trained or inexperienced may 
mishandle such “wellness checks,” exacerbating the situation and, in extreme 
cases, using deadly force against individuals with mental illness.79 
Consequently, predictions regarding suicide can, ironically, be dangerous and 
harmful for data subjects. 
D. Predictive Health Analytics as Big Business 
Predictive health analytics has already generated business opportunities 
for enterprising organizations. Companies are reportedly selling “risk scores” to 
health care providers and insurers to identify patients who are at risk of 
becoming addicted to or overdosing on opioids.80 Business giants such as 
LexisNexis collect data from insurance claims, electronic health records, 
housing information, and records relating to patients’ social and family 
connections in order to produce risk scores.81 They do all of this without asking 
patients for permission and are not required to seek consent by law.82 
Data brokers sell other types of information to health care providers as 
well. For example, LexisNexis and Acxiom sell assessments of patients based on 
“criminal records, online purchasing histories, retail loyalty programs and voter 
 
 77. Mason Marks, Suicide Prediction Technology Is Revolutionary. It Badly Needs Oversight, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/suicide-prediction-technology-is-
revolutionary-it-badly-needs-oversight/2018/12/20/214d2532-fd6b-11e8-ad40-
cdfd0e0dd65a_story.html?utm_term=.951089ae3f76 [https://perma.cc/SAK5-QCQ2 (dark archive)]. 
 78. Kaste, supra note 76 (explaining that Facebook software first scans individuals’ accounts for 
indications of “imminent self-harm,” then flags individuals for Facebook employees, who decide 
whether or not to alert the police).  
 79. See Marks, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 13 (manuscript at 24).  
 80. Mohana Ravindranath, How Your Health Information Is Sold and Turned into ‘Risk Scores’, 
POLITICO (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/03/health-risk-scores-opioid-
abuse-1139978 [https://perma.cc/MYM8-2V48] [hereinafter Ravindranath, Risk Scores]; see also 
Timothy R. Hylan et al., Automated Prediction of Risk for Problem Opioid Use in a Primary Care Setting, 
16 J. PAIN 380, 385 (2015) (discussing use of electronic health records to develop “simple risk 
stratification algorithms to initially alert clinicians to .	.	. patients at higher risk for problem opioid 
use”). 
 81. Ravindranath, Risk Scores, supra note 80. 
 82. Id. For a discussion of the limitations of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, see infra notes 167–68 and 
accompanying text. 
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registration data.”83 This information is used to identify individuals who are at 
risk of requiring costly care or readmission to a hospital.84 
Moreover, data brokers routinely supply predictive health information to 
parties outside the healthcare industry. They garner data from a myriad of 
sources, such as publicly available records, surveys, shopper loyalty programs, 
social media, magazine subscription lists, fitness devices, people’s internet 
searches, and more.85 They then organize and sell the data, often with personally 
identifying information, to interested third parties, including marketers.86 
These entities in turn can then use the medical information for the purpose of 
predictive analytics: to predict individuals’ future behaviors and health needs.87 
II. THE PRECEDENT OF GENETIC TESTING 
Predictive health analytics is novel and exciting, but it is not the first 
mechanism used to predict future health problems. A much more familiar and 
well-established technique is genetic testing, also known as DNA testing.88 
When genetic testing emerged as a prevalent diagnostic and predictive tool, it 
raised significant ethical, legal, and policy concerns.89 There is much to be 
learned from the conversations and interventions that followed. This part 
provides background information regarding genetic testing, analyzes the 
 
 83. Mohana Ravindranath, Does Your Doctor Need to Know What You Buy on Amazon?, POLITICO 
(Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/30/the-doctor-will-see-through-you-now-
893437 [https://perma.cc/5V7N-SDKN]. 
 84. Id. For a discussion of the privacy and discrimination concerns that such practices raise, see 
infra Section III.B. 
 85. Adam Tanner, Strengthening the Protection of Patient Medical Data, CENTURY FOUND. (Jan. 10, 
2017), https://tcf.org/content/report/strengthening-protection-patient-medical-data/?agreed=1 
[https://perma.cc/T2J9-KP8K (staff uploaded archive)]; Sam Thielman, Your Private Medical Data Is 
for Sale – and It’s Driving a Business Worth Billions, GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/10/medical-data-multibillion-dollar-business-
report-warns [https://perma.cc/2EMX-DZYE]. 
 86. See Tanner, supra note 85. 
 87. Russ Cobb, 2018: Taking Your Healthcare System Marketing Strategies into the Consumer Age, 
BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/patient-
engagement/2018-taking-your-healthcare-system-marketing-strategies-into-the-consumer-age.html 
[https://perma.cc/QDZ4-K2UZ]; see Thielman, supra note 85. For a discussion of the privacy and 
discrimination concerns that such practices raise, see infra Section III.B. 
 88. See Wylie Burke, Genetic Testing, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1867, 1867 (2002); Genetic Testing 
FAQ, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., https://www.genome.gov/19516567/faq-about-genetic-
testing/ [https://perma.cc/AH3F-9E2C] (“Genetic testing uses laboratory methods to look at your 
genes, which are the DNA instructions you inherit from your mother and your father. .	.	. Genetic tests 
may be used to identify increased risks of health problems, to choose treatments, or to assess responses 
to treatments.”); Genetic Testing: How It Is Used for Healthcare, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
https://report.nih.gov/nihfactsheets/ViewFactSheet.aspx?csid=43 [https://perma.cc/DE2G-WQ5U]. 
 89. See infra Section II.B. 
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concerns that it raised, and discusses the legal and policy interventions that were 
implemented to address some of those concerns. Many parallels can be drawn 
between genetic testing and predictive health analytics. However, thus far, 
there has been little outcry for safeguards relating to long-term health 
predictions that are not based on genetics. 
A. Genetic Testing 
In the late 1960s, scientists developed the ability to test fetuses for Down 
syndrome with a sample of amniotic fluid.90 Fetal genetic testing became 
common beginning in the 1970s, and today, it is used to screen for Tay-Sachs 
disease, sickle cell disease, cystic fibrosis, and many other illnesses.91 
Genetic testing can also analyze disease risks after birth and provide 
information regarding the likelihood that individuals will develop specific 
maladies in the future.92 In 1990, Mary King-Claire identified a genetic 
mutation,93 BRCA1, that is linked to breast and ovarian cancer, as is BRCA2, 
which was discovered shortly thereafter.94 Since then, scientists have discovered 
a myriad of genetic abnormalities that can increase disease vulnerabilities and 
have developed predictive genetic tests for some of them.95 For example, 
predictive testing can be done for early-onset familial Alzheimer’s disease, a 
 
 90. Glenn E. Palomaki, Screening for Down’s Syndrome, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 532, 532 (1995) 
(book review). Amniotic fluid is the fluid that surrounds the fetus in the womb. Lori Smith, What’s to 
Know About Amniotic Fluid?, MED. NEWS TODAY (June 27, 2018), 
https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/307082.php [https://perma.cc/7P67-K64F]. 
 91. Nancy Press, Genetic Testing and Screening, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND BENCH TO 
CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, 
AND CAMPAIGNS 73, 73 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008).  
 92. LORI B. ANDREWS, MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN & MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, GENETICS: 
ETHICS, LAW, AND POLICY 301 (4th ed. 2015); What Are the Types of Genetic Tests?, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. 
MED. (Aug. 6, 2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/testing/uses [https://perma.cc/APM9-3U8T].  
 93. A mutation “is a permanent alteration in the DNA sequence that makes up a gene, such that 
the sequence differs from what is found in most people.” What Is a Gene Mutation and How Do Mutations 
Occur?, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED. (Aug. 6, 2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/
mutationsanddisorders/genemutation [https://perma.cc/C536-HMW4].  
 94. See Press, supra note 91, at 73; Lydia Ramsey, Over a 40-Year Career, This ‘Stubborn Scientist’ 
Helped Change the Way We Think About Cancer and Genetics, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 16, 2017), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/mary-claire-king-and-the-impact-brca-genes-had-on-cancer-
genetics-2017-11 [https://perma.cc/DC2G-Z7GL]; BRCA1 & BRCA2 Genes: Risk for Breast & Ovarian 
Cancer, MEMORIAL SLOAN KETTERING CANCER CTR., https://www.mskcc.org/cancer-care/risk-
assessment-screening/hereditary-genetics/genetic-counseling/brca1-brca2-genes-risk-breast-ovarian 
[https://perma.cc/ZC3R-Z6YK]. 
 95. See ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 92, at 301; Burke, supra note 88, at 1867, 1869–70.  
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variety of cancers, hereditary hemochromatosis (a disorder causing iron 
overload), Huntington’s disease, and more.96 
B. Genetic Testing Concerns 
The advent of genetic testing raised numerous concerns that were 
vigorously debated and that catapulted professional and governmental bodies 
into action. Academics wrote hundreds of articles about genetic testing, and law 
reviews dedicated entire symposium issues to the subject.97 In 1995, the 
National Institutes of Health-Department of Energy Joint Working Group on 
the Ethical, Legal and Social Implications of Human Genome Research 
established the Task Force on Genetic Testing.98 The American Academy of 
Ophthalmology convened such a task force as well.99 For purposes of 
illustration, this section will focus on three of the many concerns that were 
considered: clinical validity and accuracy; privacy and discrimination; and 
psychological harms. 
1. Clinical Validity and Accuracy 
Experts worry about the clinical validity and accuracy of genetic test 
results.100 As discussed in Section III.C below, predictive health analytics raises 
similar concerns. Many genetic tests identify only a fraction of genetic 
mutations that can cause a disease because researchers have yet to discover other 
mutations or because the price of more comprehensive testing is too high.101 
Moreover, although a subgroup of patients may have an inherited form of a 
disease such as cancer, many others will develop the disease because of 
 
 96. See Burke, supra note 88, at 1870; About Huntington’s Disease, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. 
INST. (Nov. 17, 2011), https://www.genome.gov/10001215/learning-about-huntingtons-disease/ 
[https://perma.cc/673J-QCAC]; What Are the Types of Genetic Testing?, supra note 92.  
 97. See, e.g., The Fifth Annual Health Law Symposium Communities of Color and Genetic Testing: 
Purpose, Voice, & Values, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 887 (1997) (discussing genetic testing and its possible 
ramifications); Symposium, The Genetics Revolution: Conflicts, Challenges and Conundra, 28 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 145 (2002); Symposium, Legal and Ethical Issues Raised by the Human Genome Project, 29 HOUS. 
L. REV. 1 (1992); Symposium, Legal Liabilities at the Frontier of Genetic Testing (pts. I & II), 41 
JURIMETRICS 1 (2000), 41 JURIMETRICS 145 (2001); Symposium, Living in the Genetic Age: New Issues, 
New Challenges, 3 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1 (2009). 
 98. Task Force on Genetic Testing, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (Apr. 1995), 
https://www.genome.gov/10001808/genetic-testing-task-force/ [https://perma.cc/3VRR-G3XG]. 
 99. See Edwin M. Stone et al., Recommendations for Genetic Testing of Inherited Eye Diseases, 119 
OPHTHALMOLOGY 2408, 2408 (2012) (providing a report drafted by the task force convened by the 
American Academy of Ophthalmology). 
 100. See Burke, supra note 88, at 1871; Neil A. Holtzman, Promoting Safe and Effective Genetic Tests 
in the United States: Work of the Task Force on Genetic Testing, 45 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY F. 732, 737 
(1999). 
 101. See Burke, supra note 88, at 1871. 
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environmental or other triggers without having genetic mutations.102 
Individuals who undergo genetic testing and receive negative results may 
mistakenly conclude that they are immune to the disease at issue. Thus, a 
woman who is found not to have the BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutation may decline 
appropriate screening measures, such as routine mammograms and 
gynecological exams believing she is not at risk. In truth, however, only five to 
ten percent of breast and ovarian cancers are hereditary.103 
Another risk is that the opposite will occur. An individual who receives a 
positive genetic test result may panic and take unnecessarily aggressive 
preventive measures.104 Many genetic mutations are not completely penetrant; 
that is, not all individuals with the abnormality will develop the disease at 
issue.105 For example, a woman who tests positive for the BRCA1 mutation has 
only a fifty-five to sixty-five percent chance of developing breast cancer by the 
age of seventy.106 Women who fully understand the meaning of their test results 
and the extent of their risk may or may not want to undergo prophylactic radical 
mastectomies, and either decision would be rational. 
Physicians and patients who use genetic testing must be fully educated 
about how to interpret test results and the limitations of the information they 
reveal.107 It is all too easy to misconstrue test outcomes and attribute more 
certainty to genetic predictions than they warrant.108 Such misunderstandings 
can lead to consequential medical treatment missteps. 
2. Privacy and Discrimination 
The dearth of regulation designed to protect patients against medical 
privacy violations and genetic discrimination led to significant concern in legal 
and policy circles for several decades.109 Until 2003, there was no federal law 
 
 102. BRCA1 & BRCA2 Genes: Risk for Breast & Ovarian Cancer, supra note 94.  
 103. Id. 
 104. ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 92, at 301–02.  
 105. What Are Reduced Penetrance and Variable Expressivity?, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED. (Aug. 6, 
2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/inheritance/penetranceexpressivity [https://perma.cc/DE7X-
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mutation in a specific gene) who exhibit signs and symptoms of a genetic disorder.”). 
 106. BRCA1 and BRCA2, SUSAN G. KOMEN (Dec. 7, 2018), https://ww5.komen.org/BreastCancer/
BRCA1andBRCA2.html [https://perma.cc/R4XJ-FT2C]. 
 107. See Burke, supra note 88, at 1871 (discussing limitations). 
 108. See id. 
 109. See generally Eric Mills Holmes, Solving the Insurance/Genetic Fair/Unfair Discrimination 
Dilemma in Light of the Human Genome Project, 85 KY. L.J. 503, 507–08, 513–14, 578 (1997) (arguing 
that genetic mapping and testing could become a focal civil rights issue of the twenty-first century, 
potentially prompting the need for a legislative solution); Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination, 
Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protections for a Brave New Workplace, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1497, 
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that safeguarded the privacy of health information in general, let alone genetic 
information in particular.110 Thus, federal law did not prohibit anyone who 
possessed genetic information from disclosing it to third parties.111 At the state 
level, only a patchwork of statutes offered varying degrees of genetic privacy 
protections in some states.112 Moreover, until the passage of the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”) in 2008,113 no federal law 
prohibited third parties, such as employers and health insurers, from demanding 
that individuals provide genetic information or from discriminating on its 
basis.114 While some states took the lead and passed genetic discrimination 
legislation as early as the 1970s, the protections they offered were inconsistent 
and often limited.115 
Without comprehensive privacy protection, sensitive genetic information 
could end up in the hands of third parties that could use it to advance their own 
interests to the detriment of data subjects. The prospect of genetic 
discrimination generated a plethora of literature and many heated academic and 
policy debates.116 
For example, workers worried that employers would obtain genetic data 
through pre- or post-employment medical examinations.117 Workers were 
 
1498, 1523 (2002) (addressing concerns about genetic discrimination in employment and explaining 
that carriers of the sickle cell trait often suffered discrimination because of a lack of privacy 
protections). 
 110. HOFFMAN, supra note 29, at 62 (discussing the HIPAA Privacy Rule, which became effective 
in 2003); Karen H. Rothenberg, Breast Cancer, the Genetic “Quick Fix,” and the Jewish Community: Ethical, 
Legal, and Social Challenges, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 97, 115 (1997) (stating that at the time there was no 
federal law regarding health information). 
 111. See HOFFMAN, supra note 29, at 62 (stating that, after 2003, there were certain legislative 
provisions that regulated the dissemination of medical information to third parties); Rothenberg, supra 
note 110, at 115 (clarifying that there was no existing federal law in 1997 that addressed genetic privacy 
and confidentiality). 
 112. See Lori B. Andrews, A Conceptual Framework for Genetic Policy: Comparing the Medical, Public 
Health, and Fundamental Rights Models, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 221, 280 (2001); Rothenberg, supra note 110, 
at 115–17. 
 113. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.).  
 114. Rothenberg, supra note 110, at 107–14. 
 115. Id. at 108–09, 114–15; see also Office of Biological and Envtl. Research, U.S. Dep’t of Energy 
Office of Sci., Genetics Legislation, HUM. GENOME PROJECT INFO. ARCHIVE 1990–2003, 
https://web.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/legislat.shtml [https://perma.cc/T4N9-
AK69] (last modified Apr. 23, 2019) (describing state legislation as a “patchwork” and explaining that 
some state laws “prohibited discrimination against individuals with specific genetic traits or disorders” 
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genetic test results”). 
 116. See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text. 
 117. Ellen R. Peirce, The Regulation of Genetic Testing in the Workplace – A Legislative Proposal, 46 
OHIO ST. L.J. 771, 801–04 (1985). 
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concerned that, once they learned of individuals’ genetic abnormalities, 
employers could reject, fire, demote, or otherwise discriminate against them 
with impunity.118 
Americans were also apprehensive about the impact of genetic testing on 
health insurance coverage.119 An individual policy insurer who obtained data 
about an applicant’s disease risks could potentially decline to insure the person, 
raise premium prices, or dictate other adverse coverage conditions.120 The same 
could be true for other types of insurance, such as long-term care policies.121 
3. Psychological Harms 
A third area of concern centered on psychological harms. Individuals who 
discover they are at risk of a life-threatening disease may suffer depression and 
even become suicidal.122 They may lose motivation to be productive in their 
careers, experience diminished self-esteem, and have difficulty caring for their 
families.123 Some may even decide not to get married or have children because 
they expect to die young and do not wish to transmit a genetic abnormality to 
a child.124 On the other hand, for patients who build their lives around the 
assumption that they will inherit a disease that runs in their family, such as 
breast cancer or Huntington’s disease,125 obtaining a negative genetic test result 
 
 118. See id. While these concerns were prevalent, there was little evidence that genetic 
discrimination was actually taking place. See Jessica L. Roberts, The Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act as an Antidiscrimination Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597, 625 (2011) 
(explaining that “instead of reacting to current discrimination like its predecessors, GINA is a forward-
looking statute—designed to preempt a variety of discrimination before it becomes entrenched”). 
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11 (1991). 
 121. See Mark A. Rothstein, Predictive Genetic Testing for Alzheimer’s Disease in Long-Term Care 
Insurance, 35 GA. L. REV. 707, 707–08 (2001). 
 122. See Kathryn M. Kash, Psychosocial and Ethical Implications of Defining Genetic Risk for Cancers, 
768 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 41, 45–46 (1995) (discussing “psychological issues in women at genetic 
risk”); Katherine A. Schneider, Adverse Impact of Predisposition Testing on Major Life Activities: Lessons 
from BRCA1/2 Testing, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 365, 369, 372–74 (2000). 
 123. See Schneider, supra note 122, at 369, 372–75. 
 124. Id. at 376. 
 125. See id. at 374. 
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may be equally devastating.126 They may be confused and depressed by the need 
to reorient their lives and feel “survivor guilt” in the face of their loved ones’ 
suffering.127 
The risk of psychological injury is particularly acute for minors, especially 
when tested for adult-onset illnesses, such as Huntington’s disease.128 Experts 
questioned whether it was ethical to test individuals under the age of eighteen 
with or without the minor’s assent.129 They also pondered who should gain 
access to test results and the extent to which clinicians should ask both parents 
and their children to consent to the testing.130 
If preventive measures such as regular screening and curative medical 
interventions are available, genetic testing of children can be justified and 
beneficial.131 However, in the absence of such measures, the American Society 
of Human Genetics recommended against testing because of potential negative 
psychosocial implications for minors and their family members.132 Knowing that 
they live in the shadow of an impending illness could ravage minors’ 
psychological well-being.133 Likewise, discovery of a child’s genetic abnormality 
may upend family dynamics as the affected child may be treated either as more 
precious than others or less favorably because the child does not have a 
promising future.134 Admittedly, however, in the absence of genetic testing, 
families in which a genetic disease is prevalent may make assumptions about a 
child’s predisposition to the illness and experience some of the same stress and 
inequities.135 
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C. Legal and Policy Interventions 
As genetic testing became increasingly common, legislators and other 
policymakers implemented a variety of measures to address the concerns that it 
raised.136 This part will focus on three of these measures: state and federal 
antidiscrimination legislation, the HIPAA Privacy Rule, and self-regulation 
mechanisms. 
1. State and Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation 
States began enacting legislation to prohibit genetic discrimination as 
early as the 1970s.137 Early laws focused on protecting individuals with the sickle 
cell trait.138 In 1991, Wisconsin was the first state to enact a more comprehensive 
statute that prohibited employers from requiring any genetic testing or 
discriminating against workers who undergo genetic tests.139 Thereafter, the 
vast majority of states enacted genetic antidiscrimination statutes, though they 
varied significantly in scope and content.140 As applied to health insurers, these 
laws imposed restrictions on using genetic information to determine coverage 
eligibility or premium levels, requiring applicants to undergo genetic testing, or 
disclosing genetic information to others without consent.141 As applied to 
employers, the laws prohibited employers from discriminating on the basis of 
genetic information and from requesting, requiring, or obtaining genetic 
information.142 
Congress considered genetic discrimination bills for thirteen long years.143 
Finally, President George W. Bush signed GINA into law on May 21, 2008.144 
GINA applies to the use of predictive genetic information by health insurers 
 
 136. Office of Biological and Envtl. Research, U.S. Dep’t of Energy Office of Sci., supra note 115.  
 137. ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 92, at 776.  
 138. See id.  
 139. Id.; see WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.372 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 5).  
 140. See Genetics and Health Insurance State Anti-Discrimination Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2008), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/genetic-nondiscrimination-in-
health-insurance-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/5YU2-47Z8] [hereinafter Genetics and Health Insurance]; 
see also Genetic Employment Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2008), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/genetic-employment-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/VN6J-TGKC]. 
 141. See Genetics and Health Insurance, supra note 140. 
 142. See Genetic Employment Laws, supra note 140. 
 143. ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 92, at 777.  
 144. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–233, 122 Stat. 881 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.); President Bush Signs the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (May 21, 2008), 
https://www.genome.gov/27026050/president-bush-signs-the-genetic-information-
nondiscrimination-act-of-2008/ [https://perma.cc/Q4ZR-RJN5]. 
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and employers.145 The law does not cover those who already manifest symptoms 
of a genetic disease.146 
Title I of the Act prohibits genetic discrimination in health insurance.147 
Health insurers offering group plans may not modify premium prices and 
contribution amounts based on genetic information.148 Similarly, insurers 
offering individual health plans may not require genetic testing or use genetic 
information to establish rules for eligibility, premium prices, or contribution 
amounts, or to apply preexisting condition exclusions for coverage.149 
GINA’s Title II focuses on employment discrimination,150 prohibiting 
employers from discriminating against employees in hiring, firing, or other 
employment practices based on genetic information.151 The law defines “genetic 
information” as including genetic testing of both individuals and their family 
members, as well as family disease histories.152 Furthermore, Title II prohibits 
employers from attempting to obtain genetic information about applicants or 
employees by requesting, requiring, or purchasing it.153 
GINA has many critics who decry its arguably anemic protections.154 For 
example, it applies only to health insurers and employers rather than to all 
parties that might possess genetic information (such as life or disability 
insurers) and might subject individuals to discrimination on its basis.155 GINA 
 
 145. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act §§	101–04, 201–03, 122 Stat. at	833–903, 905–
10 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.); President Bush Signs the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, supra note 144.  
 146. Mark A. Rothstein, GINA’s Beauty Is Only Skin Deep, 22 GENE WATCH 9, 10 (2009) (“The 
problem is that GINA only applies to asymptomatic individuals.”). Many symptomatic individuals, 
however, will be protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) 
(2012) (defining “disability” under the ADA). 
 147. 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012). 
 148. Id. § 1182(b)(3). 
 149. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-53(a)–(d)(1) (2012). 
 150. Id. § 2000ff-1. 
 151. Id. § 2000ff-1(a). 
 152. Id. § 2000ff(4)(A) (defining genetic information as “(i) [an] individual’s genetic tests, (ii) the 
genetic tests of family members of [an] individual, and (iii) the manifestation of a disease or disorder 
in family members of [an] individual”). 
 153. Id. § 2000ff-1(b). 
 154. See, e.g., Bradley A. Areheart & Jessica L. Roberts, GINA, Big Data, and the Future of Employee 
Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 710, 745 (2019) (noting that “the scholarly reaction to GINA has been almost 
entirely negative”); Russell Korobkin & Rahul Rajkumar, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
— A Half-Step Toward Risk Sharing, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 335, 337 (2008) (criticizing “[t]he arbitrary 
nature of the categories GINA creates”); Rothstein, supra note 146, at 9 (“Unfortunately, the 
protections afforded individuals under either state laws prohibiting genetic discrimination in health 
insurance or GINA are not particularly robust or valuable.”). 
 155. See	29 U.S.C.	§	1182(b)(3) (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§	300gg-53(a)–(d)(1), 2000f(4)(A), 2000ff-
1(a)–(b). 
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is also unlikely to cover a range of non-genetic biologic information that may 
be of interest to third parties, such as epigenetic markers and the microbiome.156 
A full analysis of GINA or parallel state legislation is beyond the scope of 
this Article. For the purposes of this Article, GINA is relevant only to 
demonstrate that legislators recognized that genetic testing could yield both 
benefits and serious risks. They were sufficiently thoughtful and concerned 
about those risks to enact statutory interventions, however imperfect. 
Policymakers should be equally responsible in tackling the risks of long-term 
predictive health analytics now.157 
2. The HIPAA Privacy Rule 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule, which went into effect in 2003, is a set of 
federal regulations that addresses the privacy of health information.158 The 
Privacy Rule establishes that, with some exceptions, “covered entities”159 must 
obtain patients’ permission to disclose their protected health information to 
third parties.160 As of 2013, “health information” explicitly includes genetic 
information.161 
Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, covered entities must allow patients to 
view and obtain copies of their health records and receive an accounting of 
disclosures of their protected health information.162 In addition, patients can ask 
healthcare providers to correct errors in their medical records or to use their 
health data restrictively.163 Covered entities that suffer privacy breaches of 
 
 156. Areheart & Roberts, supra note 154, at 748–49 (stating that “at present it is unclear whether 
GINA covers epigenetic markers, the microbiome, or myriad other kinds of biological information 
related to new technologies”).  
 157. See infra Parts III & IV (discussing predictive health analytics concerns and suggested 
legislative interventions). 
 158. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.101–.534 (2018); HIPAA for Professionals, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS. (June 16, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/index.html [https://perma.cc/
T2WS-FTS5]. The HIPAA Privacy Rule was promulgated pursuant to the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 and was amended in accordance with the Health 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (“HITECH”) Act of 2009; see Health 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, div. A, tit. XIII & 
div. B, tit. IV, 123 Stat. 226, 467 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.);	see 
also American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (“ARRA”), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 226 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  
 159. For a definition of covered entities, see 42 U.S.C. §	17934 (2012); 45 C.F.R. §§	160.102–.103. 
See also HOFFMAN, supra note 29, at 73. 
 160. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.508–.510 (2018). 
 161. Id. § 160.103; Genetic Information Privacy, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/issues/genetic-information-privacy [https://perma.cc/TP3E-ZDPH]. 
 162. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.520(b)(1)(iv), .528 (2018).  
 163. Id. §§ 164.520(b)(1)(iv), .522(a)(1). 
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unsecured data, such as hacking occurrences, must notify affected individuals, 
the Department of Health and Human Services, and, in instances of large 
breaches, the media.164 
The related HIPAA Security Rule, which became effective in 2005, 
promotes secure storage and processing of electronic health information 
(“EHI”).165 It delineates administrative, physical, and technical safeguards to 
protect EHI’s confidentiality, integrity, and availability.166 
The HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules offer valuable protections to 
American patients. However, like genetic antidiscrimination statutes, they are 
limited in scope and have been subject to criticism.167 For example, “covered 
entity” includes only “a health plan, .	.	. a health care clearinghouse, .	.	. a health 
care provider who transmits any health information” electronically for purposes 
of HIPAA-relevant transactions, and their business associates.168 Other parties 
that possess and handle health information, such as data brokers and marketers, 
need not comply with the Rules’ privacy and security mandates.169 
Another noteworthy regulatory gap in the HIPAA Privacy and Security 
Rules is the absence of a private cause of action.170 Thus, individuals whose 
health data is breached cannot sue wrongdoers for damages under federal law 
no matter what consequences they suffer.171 Instead, the regulations leave 
enforcement solely in the hands of the Department of Health and Human 
Services: Office for Civil Rights and state attorneys general offices,172 which 
may or may not have adequate staffing and resources for robust prosecutorial 
activities. 
In addition, the HIPAA Privacy Rule features numerous exceptions. 
Covered entities can disclose patients’ medical data for purposes of treatment, 
payment, and healthcare operations without patient authorization.173 Thus, the 
regulations permit physicians to consult colleagues about patients and to ask 
 
 164. Id. §§ 164.400–.408. Entities must notify the media if a breach involves “more than 500 
residents of a State or jurisdiction.” Id. § 164.408(a). “Unsecured protected health information” means 
information “that is not rendered unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable to unauthorized persons 
through the use of a [specified] technology or methodology[,]” such as encryption. Id. § 164.402. 
 165. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace: Protecting the Security 
of Electronic Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331, 335–36 (2007). 
 166. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302–.318 (2018). 
 167. See, e.g., Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 165, at 344–59. 
 168. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018). See also 42 U.S.C. § 17934 (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2018). 
 169. See HOFFMAN, supra note 29, at 73. 
 170. See id. at 75. 
 171. Id. 
 172. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(d) (2012); 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.300, .306. 
 173. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a) (2018). 
 
98 N.C. L. REV. 123 (2019) 
146 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98 
 
administrators to review records for billing or other office-related purposes 
without the patients’ knowledge.174 
The rule exempts additional disclosures as well, such as those made for law 
enforcement, public health, and other listed purposes.175 In general, these 
exceptions are reasonable and sound. However, patients should understand that 
they are often unaware of who is viewing their health data and for what purpose. 
The HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules fall short of providing patients 
with comprehensive protection. Nevertheless, they constitute important 
advances in the privacy arena and address some of the concerns raised by genetic 
testing. The HIPAA Rules’ application to predictive health analytics and their 
gaps in this context will be analyzed in Section III.B below. 
3. Self-Regulation 
Self-regulation by genetic testing professionals provides another source of 
genetic testing constraints. Professional organizations have authored practice 
guidelines, and providers routinely defer testing until they have educated 
patients about its potential consequences. For example, the American Society 
of Breast Surgeons issued guidance that formulated recommendations for 
genetic testing related to breast cancer and discussed testing limitations.176 
Likewise, the American Society of Human Genetics Board of Directors and the 
American College of Medical Genetics Board of Directors published a 
document that discourages testing children for adult-onset diseases if they will 
derive no medical or psychological benefit from being tested as minors.177 The 
American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics issued practice guidelines 
related to genetic testing for numerous conditions.178 Unfortunately, medical 
practices do not always implement clinical practice guidelines effectively or 
 
 174. Id. § 164.506(c). 
 175. Id. §§ 164.502, .512. 
 176. Consensus Guideline on Genetic Testing for Hereditary Breast Cancer, AM. SOC’Y BREAST 
SURGEONS 1–2, 5 (2019), https://www.breastsurgeons.org/about/statements/PDF_Statements/
Hereditary_Genetic_Testing_Patients_With_Without_Breast_Cancer.pdf [https://perma.cc/26SV-
G36U]. 
 177. Botkin et al., supra note 131, at 7; see also Quaid, supra note 128, at 115–17 (discussing testing 
guidelines for Huntington’s disease, including those addressing predictive testing of minors).  
 178. Practice Guidelines, AM. C. MED. GENETICS & GENOMICS (2019), https://www.acmg.net/
ACMG/Medical-Genetics-Practice-Resources/Practice-Guidelines.aspx [https://perma.cc/ARB5-
4LFF (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
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consistently.179 However, when healthcare providers adhere to sound clinical 
practice guidelines, they can often achieve improved treatment outcomes.180 
Clinicians typically offer counseling to patients who are considering 
genetic testing.181 Counseling is designed to ensure that patients make fully 
informed decisions about pursuing testing in light of the benefits and risks that 
exist in their particular circumstances.182 A variety of healthcare providers can 
educate patients about genetic testing, but a growing number of practices 
include professional genetic counselors with master’s degrees.183 The American 
Board of Genetic Counselors has certified over 4000 genetic counselors thus 
far.184 Therefore, rather than rushing to test patients after only a brief 
discussion, responsible clinicians exercise a degree of self-restraint and take the 
steps necessary to ensure that patients provide meaningful and genuinely 
informed consent to the procedure. 
III. LONG-TERM PREDICTIVE HEALTH ANALYTICS CONCERNS 
Like genetic testing, long-term predictive health analytics is fraught with 
risks but, unlike the perils of genetic testing, these are garnering too little 
attention.185 This part highlights three areas of concern: psychological harms, 
privacy and discrimination, and erroneous predictions. It concludes by 
analyzing the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) regulatory power 
over long-term predictive health analytics. 
 
 179. Fargol Mostofian et al., Changing Physician Behavior: What Works?, 21 AM J. MANAGED CARE 
75, 82 (2015) (“Various implementation methods are utilized to try to change physician behavior, and 
implementing the most effective ones is crucial to success.”); M. Hassan Murad, Clinical Practice 
Guidelines: A Primer on Development and Dissemination, 92 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 423, 423, 429–31 
(2017) (“[G]uidelines require active dissemination and innovative implementation strategies.”). 
 180. William J. Hanney et al., The Influence of Physical Therapy Guideline Adherence on Healthcare 
Utilization and Costs Among Patients with Low Back Pain: A Systematic Review of the Literature, 11 PLOS 
ONE e0156799, 1–2, 15 (2016); Murad, supra note 179, at 429; Jannicke Slettli Wathne et al., The 
Association Between Adherence to National Antibiotic Guidelines and Mortality, Readmission and Length of 
Stay in Hospital Inpatients: Results from a Norwegian Multicentre, Observational Cohort Study, 8 
ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE & INFECTION CONTROL 1, 4, 8 (2019). 
 181. See Burke, supra note 88, at 1873. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 92, at 329; About NSGC: The Leading Voice for Genetic 
Counselors, NAT’L SOC’Y GENETIC COUNS., https://www.nsgc.org/page/about-nsgc 
[https://perma.cc/4RZR-A9WH].  
 184. Mission Statement, Purpose and Values, AM. BOARD GENETIC COUNS., 
https://www.abgc.net/about-abgc/mission-history/ [https://perma.cc/F2RQ-5TSK]. 
 185. See I. Glenn Cohen & Harry S. Graver, Cops, Docs, and Code: A Dialogue Between Big Data in 
Health Care and Predictive Policing, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 437, 446 (2017) (“The legal literature on 
predictive analytics in health care is at this moment less robust than that on predictive policing, 
although that is changing.”). 
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A. Psychological Harms 
Predictions of future ailments based on predictive health analytics can be 
just as traumatizing as predictions based on genetic testing.186 Individuals who 
learn from their doctors that they are likely to develop heart disease, dementia, 
or psychosis in the future might find the news devastating.187 As a result, they 
could have difficulty concentrating on work, experience strain in their 
relationships, or even become clinically depressed or suicidal.188 Like genetic 
testing of children, predictive health analytics involving minors raises 
particularly troubling questions.189 Worrisome predictions can adversely impact 
children’s futures and disrupt family dynamics.190 
Furthermore, physicians who identify certain individuals as vulnerable to 
opioid addiction, cognitive decline, or suicide191 may treat those patients 
differently, to the patients’ detriment. For example, they may refuse to provide 
potential opioid addicts with needed pain medication.192 They may also relate 
poorly to patients at risk of dementia or suicide, treating them as cognitively 
compromised or lacking autonomy even when they are fully competent.193 So 
too, clinicians may try to drive patients who are labelled as potentially high-risk 
and high-cost away from their practices.194 
It is also possible that individuals will obtain distressing health predictions 
not from their doctors but from commercial enterprises without being aware in 
advance that anyone has assessed their health risks.195 Data brokers sell health 
information to interested buyers, and companies such as LexisNexis and 
Acxiom have already begun to engage in predictive health analytics.196 
Marketers will likely be eager to obtain health predictions about patients in 
order to tailor their marketing materials effectively.197 Imagine individuals 
 
 186. See supra Section I.B. 
 187. See supra Section I.B. 
 188. See supra notes 122–26 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra notes 128–34 and accompanying text. 
 190. See supra notes 128–34 and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra Section I.B. 
 192. See Ravindranath, Risk Scores, supra note 80. 
 193. Marks, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 13 (manuscript at 24) (“Patients with mental illnesses 
often report feeling dehumanized and dismissed by healthcare providers.”). 
 194. Cohen et al., supra note 6, at 1141 (“For instance, the data could be used to identify vulnerable 
high-risk, high-cost patients and exclude them from care.”). 
 195. See supra notes 80–87 and accompanying text. 
 196. See supra notes 80–87 and accompanying text. 
 197. See HOFFMAN, supra note 29, at 60; Cobb, supra note 87. Commercial enterprises already use 
data mining for marketing purposes. In one well-known case, Target sent a teenage girl advertisements 
for baby goods after determining that she was pregnant based on her prior purchases. See Kashmir Hill, 
How Target Figured out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Father Did, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012), 
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receiving the news that they are at risk of cognitive decline through an 
electronic advertisement urging them to purchase memory-enhancing products. 
People who do not have the support of a physician and do not receive a clear, 
medical explanation of the prediction and its degree of certainty will be all the 
more vulnerable to distress and misunderstandings. 
B. Privacy and Discrimination 
Because the HIPAA Privacy Rule governs only a subset of parties that 
possess health information,198 not all predictive health analytics outcomes will 
be subject to privacy protections.199 Entities that are not health plans, healthcare 
clearinghouses, healthcare providers, or their business associates are not legally 
bound to refrain from disclosing health information about patients.200 Thus, 
data brokers are permitted to sell health-related information to marketers.201 
Moreover, entities that are not covered by HIPAA could disclose and publicize 
individually identifiable predictive health analytics results. One can imagine the 
media obtaining predictions about entertainers and politicians that could cause 
significant embarrassment and even ruin careers. Predictions about ordinary 
people could likewise be widely publicized through social media and be available 
to anyone with a smart device. 
It is also noteworthy that noncovered entities are not subject to the 
requirements of the HIPAA Security Rule.202 As such entities may be tempted 
to use security shortcuts, they may be vulnerable to hacking and other data 
breaches.203 Consequently, data stored by commercial enterprises for predictive 
health analytics purposes may be more vulnerable to privacy violations than 
HIPAA-protected health information. 
Given the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s limitations, individuals’ health 
predictions can easily land in the hands of third parties who may use them to 
 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-
pregnant-before-her-father-did/#50c347c26668 [https://perma.cc/WL24-AVWZ]. The girl’s father, 
who saw the mail but was unaware of his daughter’s condition, angrily confronted a Target manager. 
Id. But, after later speaking with his daughter, he learned that Target was right. Id. 
 198. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 199. See Marks, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 13 (manuscript at 6) (discussing privacy risks 
related to suicide predictions).  
 200. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 17934 (2012); 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102–.103 (2018). 
 201. See Erin McCann, What HIPAA Doesn’t Cover, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (July 16, 2014, 10:58 
AM), https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/what-hipaa-doesnt-cover [https://perma.cc/CK4G-
7DLA]. 
 202. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, supra note 165, at 344–47. 
 203. See id. at 332–34 (discussing various data breaches); Topol, supra note 5, at 52 (noting “the 
risk of deliberate hacking of an algorithm to harm people at a large scale”). 
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further their own economic agendas.204 Employers, lenders, life insurers, and 
others with a stake in individuals’ future well-being may be interested in 
predictions about individuals’ health status in later years.205 Employers, for 
example, are interested in employees who will not have productivity or 
absenteeism problems and will not generate high health insurance costs.206 They 
may be very tempted to reject or terminate workers whom they believe to be at 
high risk of becoming seriously ill in the coming years. Similarly, lenders seek 
borrowers who will remain able to work and pay off their loans, and life insurers 
may use predictive information about applicants to make eligibility or pricing 
decisions.207 
Currently, the antidiscrimination laws do not prohibit employers and 
others from discriminating based on predictions of future health problems 
(other than predictions based on genetic information, which are covered by 
GINA).208 The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the primary federal 
disability discrimination law, prohibits discrimination related only to: 
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities of such individual; 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment . . . .209 
Consequently, it does not reach discrimination based on future physical or 
mental impairments or disabilities. This legislative gap creates worrisome 
opportunities for discrimination based on disease predictions. 
Predictive health analytics may also perpetuate other types of 
discrimination, such as sex- or race-based discrimination. Amazon’s effort to 
develop artificial-intelligence-driven software to identify the best job 
candidates illustrates this point.210 Because the predictive model’s training data 
were past resumés submitted to Amazon mostly by men, the program was biased 
 
 204. HOFFMAN, supra note 29, at 59–60 (listing a variety of parties that could be interested in 
people’s health data). 
 205. See Sharona Hoffman, Big Data’s New Discrimination Threats: Amending the Americans with 
Disabilities Act to Cover Discrimination Based on Data-Driven Predictions of Future Disease, in BIG DATA, 
HEALTH LAW, AND BIOETHICS 85, 85–86 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter Hoffman, 
New Discrimination].  
 206. Id. at 86. 
 207. HOFFMAN, supra note 29, at 60; Marks, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 13 (manuscript at 11).  
 208. See Hoffman, New Discrimination, supra note 205, at 92–95.  
 209. 42 U.S.C. § 2102(1) (2012); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 
104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)). 
 210. See Katherine Maher, Without Humans, A.I. Can Wreak Havoc, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/opinion/artificial-intelligence-wikipedia.html?smid=nytcore-
ios-share [https://perma.cc/8XN9-464W (dark archive)]. 
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against women and concluded that men were preferable job candidates.211 It is 
likewise possible that predictive models in the healthcare arena will be biased 
and wrongly conclude that women are at higher risk of various health problems. 
Furthermore, if companies such as LexisNexis and Acxiom base predictive 
models on variables that include criminal records and voter registration data,212 
they could disproportionately identify certain minorities as high-risk patients.213 
Thus, particular groups may be perceived as more prone to disease and 
biologically inferior to others.214 
C. Erroneous Predictions 
As suggested above, the results of predictive health analytics can often be 
wrong,215 just as genetic testing results can be misleading.216 In one illustrative 
example outside the health field, scientists produced “fooling images” that were 
“completely unrecognizable to humans,” but deep neural networks (a form of 
machine learning) believed “with near certainty” that they were familiar 
objects.217 
 
 211. Id. See infra Section III.C for a discussion of bias. Amazon acknowledged that its “recruiters 
looked at the recommendations generated by the tool when searching for new hires” but claimed they 
“never relied solely on those rankings” before Amazon abandoned the tool. Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon 
Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool that Showed Bias Against Women, REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-
recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G [https://perma.cc/WJ86-
DUCF]. 
 212. See Ravindranath, Risk Scores, supra note 80 (discussing risk scores based on other factors). 
 213. Minorities often have higher criminal conviction rates and lower voter turnout rates than 
whites. See THE SENT’G PROJECT, REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ON RACIAL DISPARITIES IN 
THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1–4 (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/
publications/un-report-on-racial-disparities/ [https://perma.cc/3HDS-Q5QF] (discussing the racial 
disparity that exists in the U.S. criminal justice system, specifically for African Americans); Bernard 
L. Fraga, The Turnout Gap Between Whites and Racial Minorities Is Larger Than You Think — and Hard 
to Change, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2018/09/25/the-turnout-gap-between-whites-and-racial-minorities-is-larger-than-you-think-
and-hard-to-change/?utm_term=.f46f666cc727 [https://perma.cc/8XN9-464W (dark archive)]. 
Algorithms that include these variables could consequently conclude that the relevant minorities are 
not as healthy as whites.  
 214. See Sharona Hoffman, “Racially-Tailored” Medicine Unraveled, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 395, 398 
(2005) [hereinafter Hoffman, “Racially-Tailored”]; see also Jonathan Kahn, How a Drug Becomes Ethnic: 
Law, Commerce, and the Production of Racial Categories in Medicine, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & 
ETHICS 1, 38 (2004) (“As race becomes correlated with various biological conditions, it takes only one 
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 215. See Ian A. Scott, Hope, Hype and Harms of Big Data, 49 INTERNAL MED. J. 126, 127 (2019) 
(noting ten potential harms or limitations of big data). 
 216. See supra Section II.B.1. 
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Flawed outcomes can stem from a variety of problems. One cause can be 
human error in constructing or implementing the algorithm. Big data used to 
train computers and develop learning algorithms can be rife with inaccuracies 
and data gaps or otherwise be a poor fit for the task at hand.218 Poor data quality 
will inevitably lead to poor data-driven artificial intelligence algorithms, 
consistent with the “garbage-in-garbage-out” principle.219 For example, if the 
training data consist of electronic health records that are rife with errors, the 
algorithm will likely produce poor predictions.220 
Moreover, learning algorithms can quickly become outdated.221 As human 
knowledge advances or human behaviors change, analysts may need to update 
algorithms.222 Outdated algorithms will not yield correct predictions.223 To 
illustrate, the emergence of vaping or a spike in the number of children who are 
not vaccinated might require modification of algorithms aimed at disease 
prediction. 
Even with a correct learning algorithm, the predictive model’s 
performance when using the training data224 may not generalize to real world 
data because of a phenomenon called “overfitting.”225 A particular model can 
produce accurate predictions on a set of training data but fail to provide sound 
predictions when deployed on new data, especially if the model is complex and 
the training data set was small.226 Because of the dearth of training data and the 
large number of parameters used to construct the model, “the learned 
 
PATTERN RECOGNITION 427, 427–28 (2015) (“Changing an image, originally correctly classified (e.g. 
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parameters are spuriously inferred and are unlikely to generalize well” to unseen 
data.227 In other words, overfitting occurs when a predictive model fits the 
training data “too well.”228 
Big data can also be subject to selection bias. If the data used to train 
learning algorithms or statistical models come from a health system that 
disproportionately serves particular populations (e.g., wealthy or disadvantaged 
individuals), the algorithm or model may not be generalizable to all patients.229 
Several scholars have noted the following: 
To date, Big Data has not captured certain marginalized demographics. 
Particularly concerning are racial minorities, people with low 
socioeconomic status, and immigrants. Many of the people missing from 
the data that come from sources such as Internet history, social media 
presence, and credit-card use are also missing from other sources of Big 
Data, such as electronic health records (EHRs) and genomic databases. 
The factors responsible for these gaps are diverse and include lack of 
insurance and the inability to access healthcare, to name just two . . . .230 
It is even possible that attackers will hack into medical images and records 
and tamper with them.231 Thus, malware could trick physicians into reaching 
incorrect conclusions about patients’ current or future illnesses.232 
Unfortunately, it is often impossible to discern whether a predictive model 
is sound. Learning algorithms are often opaque because they rely on extremely 
complex rules and even their programmers are uncertain about how they 
ultimately work.233 Some commentators use the term “black box medicine” to 
describe reliance on nontransparent learning algorithms.234 
Use of the terms “artificial intelligence” and “machine learning” can 
overawe people. But as one commentator notes, “[t]he only sure prediction 
 
 227. Id.  
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about the future of big data and predictive analytics is that it is unlikely to live 
up to some of the hype.”235 Algorithms, in many cases, will falsely indicate that 
individuals may suffer particular conditions in the future, and the affected data 
subjects will be left to suffer the consequences. 
D. Regulatory Uncertainty 
Predictive health analytics may be particularly vulnerable to error because 
of deficient oversight. Genetic tests are subject to regulation by the FDA and 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”), which oversees 
clinical laboratories.236 CMS does not regulate learning algorithms because no 
clinical laboratories are involved,237 and a real question exists as to whether the 
FDA will routinely oversee predictive health analytics. 
The FDA regulates medical devices, which are defined as any “instrument, 
apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other 
similar or related article . . . which is . . . intended for use in the diagnosis of 
disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention 
of disease, in man or other animals.”238 The FDA can also regulate “software as 
a medical device,” defined as “software intended to be used for one or more 
medical purposes that perform these purposes without being part of a hardware 
medical device.”239 For example, in early 2018, the FDA provided premarket 
clearance for the WAVE Clinical Platform, “an early-warning system” for 
hospitals, whose algorithm uses vital signs data to identify patients at risk of 
becoming unstable.240 The FDA also cleared Viz.AI’s Contact, which is software 
that uses an algorithm to analyze CT images for indications that patients are at 
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risk of stroke.241 In 2019, the FDA issued a proposal to improve its regulatory 
approach to algorithms that continuously learn and change over time.242 
However, the agency is empowered to regulate only algorithms used for 
medical care.243 It would not have jurisdiction over predictive health analytics 
conducted by marketers, employers, or other parties for nonmedical purposes.244 
Moreover, the FDA has traditionally refrained from regulating the 
practice of medicine.245 Thus, it may hesitate to regulate learning algorithms 
when their use seems akin to medical practice.246 While WAVE and the Viz.AI’s 
Contact application may be classified as devices designed to predict imminent 
medical crises,247 long-term predictive analytics that help doctors anticipate 
illnesses that could develop later in life might be a poorer match. This is because 
long-term predictive analytics may not be perceived as close enough to 
traditional medical devices to warrant regulation. 
Professor Nathan Cortez argues that predictive health analytics does not 
fit comfortably into any of the familiar categories of medical products, medical 
practice, or medical information for regulatory purposes.248 He and others argue 
for a new regulatory paradigm for predictive health analytics.249 
Resolving the question of the extent to which the FDA will regulate long-
term predictive health analytics is beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to 
say that there is uncertainty about the FDA’s regulatory approach to such 
learning algorithms. Because long-term health predictions can significantly 
impact people’s lives, they should not be ignored by regulators. The FDA 
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should construct thoughtful, responsible legal oversight mechanisms for all 
predictive health analytics. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
At its core, this Article is a call to action. The policymaking and scientific 
communities must not ignore the potential risks of predictive health analytics. 
Just as the growth of genetic testing elicited robust academic and policy debates, 
so too should the burgeoning phenomenon of predictive health analytics. 
Effective legal and policy interventions are needed to safeguard the rights of 
individuals. This part recommends changes to the HIPAA Privacy and Security 
Rules and to the ADA. It also advocates for the implementation of other 
oversight and self-regulation mechanisms. 
A. Legal Interventions 
Legislators should modify the laws that establish privacy and 
antidiscrimination mandates. This section focuses on the federal HIPAA 
Privacy and Security Rules and the ADA, though states could make similar 
changes to parallel state statutes.250 
1. The HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules 
As I have argued in other works,251 Congress and the Department of 
Health and Human Services should expand HIPAA’s definition of “covered 
entity.”252 The need for change has become more urgent in light of the growing 
use of predictive health analytics. The federal law and regulations could use the 
language of a much broader Texas privacy statute as a model: 
“Covered entity” means any person who: 
(A) for commercial, financial, or professional gain, monetary fees, or 
dues, or on a cooperative, nonprofit, or pro bono basis, engages, in whole 
or in part, and with real or constructive knowledge, in the practice of 
assembling, collecting, analyzing, using, evaluating, storing, or 
transmitting protected health information. The term includes a business 
associate, health care payer, governmental unit, information or computer 
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management entity, school, health researcher, health care facility, clinic, 
health care provider, or person who maintains an Internet site; 
(B) comes into possession of protected health information; 
(C) obtains or stores protected health information under this chapter; or  
(D) is an employee, agent, or contractor of a person described by 
Paragraph (A), (B), or (C) insofar as the employee, agent, or contractor 
creates, receives, obtains, maintains, uses, or transmits protected health 
information.253 
Adoption of such language would require a parallel modification to the 
definition of “health information.”254 “Health information” should be expanded 
to mean: 
any information, recorded in any form or medium, that relates to the 
past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an 
individual, including health predictions, the provision of healthcare to an 
individual, or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of 
healthcare to an individual.255 
Expanding the definitions of “covered entities” and “health information” 
would not prevent healthcare providers from contracting with business 
associates, such as LexisNexis or Acxiom, to conduct predictive health analytics 
so long as they did so for purposes of treatment, payment, or healthcare 
operations.256 It also would not prevent data brokers from accessing much of the 
data they use, such as Facebook posts, shopper loyalty program records, or voter 
registration data.257 
Nevertheless, the change would provide patients with several important 
benefits. First, it would prevent the newly covered entities from disclosing 
health predictions to third parties without the data subject’s consent. Because 
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these predictions would constitute health information about individuals’ future 
physical or mental health conditions, data brokers and other commercial 
enterprises could not sell them for financial gain to marketers, employers, and 
other interested parties without permission. Second, upon request, the newly 
covered entities would be bound to inform data subjects of all disclosures made 
concerning their protected health information.258 Third, the newly covered 
entities would have to comply with the security mandates of the HIPAA 
Security Rule.259 They therefore would be prohibited from storing health 
information and health predictions about individuals using sloppy or minimal 
security measures that do not adequately deter hacking. 
In addition, the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules should include a 
private cause of action.260 Because of budgetary constraints, government 
enforcement is often anemic.261 Furthermore, the rules do not provide aggrieved 
parties with monetary relief if they have suffered an injury resulting from a 
privacy breach.262 The proposed HIPAA changes could meaningfully enhance 
data subjects’ privacy protections and rights. 
2. The Americans with Disabilities Act 
I have also previously argued for a broadening of the ADA’s definition of 
“disability,” and I renew my call for this change here.263 The ADA’s “regarded 
as” provision protects only individuals who are “being regarded as [currently] 
having .	.	. an impairment” from discrimination.264 Congress should revise the 
“regarded as” provision of the ADA to include individuals who “are perceived 
as likely to develop physical or mental impairments in the future.”265 
This change would prohibit employers and other parties from 
discriminating against individuals because of disease predictions.266 It follows 
logically from GINA, which forbids discrimination based on a specific type of 
predictive data—that is, genetic information.267 In the era of predictive health 
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analytics, there is no justification for retaining a discrepancy between GINA 
and the ADA. Predictive models can forecast a myriad of health problems.268 
These include inherited diseases such as heart conditions, some forms of 
Alzheimer’s disease, and many more.269 GINA would not cover such predictions 
because they are not based on genetic tests or family histories.270 The law should 
not protect people only when the prediction of a future disease is rooted directly 
in genetic information. With respect to antidiscrimination mandates, genetic 
exceptionalism271 no longer makes sense. 
B. Other Oversight Mechanisms 
Academics and other experts have begun building a literature about the 
legal and ethical implications of predictive health analytics only in recent 
years.272 It is a long way from reaching the proportions of the genetic testing 
literature. Moreover, existing legal literature has paid little attention to long-
term predictive health analytics, which raises significant concerns about 
psychological harms and discrimination.273 Legal and bioethics scholars should 
no more ignore these risks than they did the similar risks of genetic testing.274 
What follows is a brief discussion of potential oversight improvements for the 
predictive health analytics industry and medical professionals. 
1. Guidelines and Validation 
A few papers have undertaken the development of initial guidelines for 
predictive health analytics.275 For example, a panel of seventeen experts 
proposed the following guiding principles in 2016: 
1. Data Barriers: Establish mechanisms within the scientific community 
to support data sharing for predictive model development and testing. 
2. Transparency: Set standards around e-HPA validation based on 
principles of scientific transparency and reproducibility. 
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3. Ethics: Develop both individual-centered and society-centered risk-
benefit approaches to evaluate e-HPA. 
4. Regulation and Certification: Construct a self-regulation and 
certification framework within e-HPA. 
5. Education and Training: Make significant changes to medical, nursing, 
and paraprofessional curricula by including training for understanding, 
evaluating, and utilizing predictive models.276 
The scholars that have pondered predictive health analytics all agree that 
transparency and oversight are of critical importance.277 They recommend the 
establishment of industry-wide validation and certification mechanisms 
implemented by the Joint Commission, certifiers overseen by the FDA, 
independent institutional review boards, or other third parties.278 
Experts have developed a variety of techniques to assess learning 
algorithms and predictive models.279 A popular method for estimating 
prediction error is cross-validation.280 Another method to assess statistical 
accuracy is the bootstrap method.281 However, these techniques constitute 
internal validation that reuses the data with which the learning algorithm was 
trained.282 It is even more important for researchers to engage in external 
validation of learning algorithms in the field, using real patients under the same 
conditions as those intended for the algorithm’s post-approval use.283 Such 
validation, preferably at multiple sites and institutions, should ensure that the 
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algorithm’s predictive capability generalizes to the true target population.284 
Oversight bodies should consist of predictive health analytics and validation 
experts who can be trusted to scrutinize proposed assessment methods and 
ensure that they are appropriate.285 
The recommendations offered thus far are sound, and experts should 
continue to develop and augment them in order to furnish policymakers with 
proposals that are as detailed and evidence-based as possible. Oversight and 
quality control could prevent many erroneous predictions and save clinicians 
and patients considerable angst. 
2. Self-Regulation 
Healthcare professionals should adopt their own safeguards in order to 
minimize the hazards of long-term disease predictions for patients, as they did 
in the case of genetic testing. To that end, physicians should receive training 
concerning long-term predictive health analytics so that they understand the 
extent to which it can be limited and uncertain. They should also counsel and 
educate patients before disclosing troubling health predictions to them. A 
process akin to genetic counseling would be very useful.286 Patients should 
understand the advantages and disadvantages of learning about their disease 
risks and be able to make informed decisions; they should not rush into 
obtaining long-term health predictions without carefully thinking through the 
potential for psychological harm, discrimination, and other adverse 
consequences.287 
In addition, professional organizations should develop practice guidelines 
regarding when it is appropriate to employ predictive health analytics and the 
extent to which clinicians should rely upon it.288 They should thus follow the 
precedent set in the arena of genetic testing.289 For example, practice guidelines 
might recommend that clinicians refrain from obtaining certain types of 
predictions about children.290 They might also suggest which interventions 
should and should not be implemented in response to predictions of suicidal 
ideation, clinical depression, opioid addiction, or other ailments. 
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Some industries have recognized the need for self-regulation and 
principled approaches to predictive analytics. For example, in March 2019, 
Google announced that it would launch an Advanced Technology External 
Advisory Council to provide ethics oversight and outside input regarding its 
development of artificial intelligence.291 However, just days later, Google 
scrapped the Council because of protests regarding some of its members.292 
Hopefully, other ethics initiatives will be more enduring and successful.293 
Education, counseling, practice guidelines, and expert review could go far in 
maximizing the benefits and minimizing the risks of predictive health analytics. 
CONCLUSION 
We should not be blinded by enthusiasm for long-term predictive health 
analytics or be naively seduced by technologies with impressive names like 
“artificial intelligence” and “machine learning.” There is certainly much to be 
gained from prudent use of new predictive capabilities. However, the 
technologies come with significant risks of psychological harm, privacy 
violations, and discrimination, among others. Moreover, predictive models and 
learning algorithms are often flawed and produce erroneous outcomes. Many of 
these potential harms were previously considered and addressed in the context 
of genetic testing. Rather than leave a regulatory void, scientists and 
policymakers should adopt similar approaches for long-term predictive health 
analytics. This Article has proposed just a few legal and nonlegal interventions 
designed to enhance data subjects’ privacy rights, antidiscrimination 
protections, and ability to make informed decisions about obtaining disease 
predictions. However, many more minds must tackle the challenges of 
predictive health analytics and develop mechanisms to enhance the integrity 
and benefits of this technology. Ignoring the potential perils and unintended 
 
 291. Jillian D’Onfro, Google Launches Advisory Council To Help Company Question Assumptions on 
Ethical AI, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jilliandonfro/2019/03/26/google-
launches-advisory-council-to-help-company-question-assumptions-on-ethical-ai/#db487d779420 
[https://perma.cc/TDK9-E2AF]. 
 292. Jillian D’Onfro, Google Scraps Its AI Ethics Board Less than Two Weeks After Launch in the Wake 
of Employee Protest, FORBES (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jilliandonfro/
2019/04/04/google-cancels-its-ai-ethics-board-less-than-two-weeks-after-launch-in-the-wake-of-
employee-protest/#6b58a8d06e28 [https://perma.cc/HC5Z-QCHN]. The controversial members 
were Kay Coles James, President of the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think-tank, and Dyan 
Gibbens, CEO of a drone company called Trumbull Unmanned. See id. 
 293. See, e.g., Axon AI and Policing Technology Ethics Board, AXON, https://www.axon.com/info/ai-
ethics [https://perma.cc/P4WM-P4MB]. Axon produces technology and weapon products for law 
enforcement, including the taser. See Stephen Nellis, Taser Changes Name to Axon in Shift to Software 
Services, REUTERS (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taser/taser-changes-name-
to-axon-in-shift-to-software-services-idUSKBN177265 [https://perma.cc/K2TD-J9RF]. 
98 N.C. L. REV. 123 (2019) 
2019] GENETIC TESTING  163 
 
consequences of long-term predictive analytics is imprudent and could cost 
society dearly. 
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